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URBAN TRANSPORT MARKET: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Executive Summary 
 
1.The Institute for Transport Studies (ITS) was commissioned by the Department of Transport 
(DoT), the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) and the Passenger Transport 
Executive Group (PTEG) to undertake this project in November 1992. 
 
2.The objectives of this study were: 
 
 (a)to establish a simple economic model of urban transport operations, based on present 
policies; 
 
 (b)to estimate, using the model, the theoretically optimal form of intervention in urban rail 
under the present policy constraints, and differences between this optimum and 
current procedures; 
 
 (c)to investigate how improved procedures might be implemented in practice in the light of 
the kind of data which are currently available or become available in the course of a 
Section 56 appraisal and to make suggestions for additional data collection. 
 
3.The first objective was achieved by developing a stylised model of urban transport operations 
within a given corridor.  This model was based loosely on work carried out by ITS in 
assessing new rail services between Mansfield and Nottingham.  The model has been given 
the acronym MUPPIT (Model of Urban Pricing Policy in Transport) and contains a number 
of features which represent an advance over previous models of this type. 
 
4.MUPPIT produces three main evaluation measures: 
 
 a Financial Net Present Value (NPV), which takes into account rail operator costs and 
revenues.  This is also referred to as financial appraisal; 
 
 a Social NPV, which takes into account  bus and rail operators' costs and revenues, and 
changes in bus, rail and car user times and costs, including accidents. This is also 
referred to as full social cost-benefit analysis; 
 
 A Restricted Cost-Benefit Analysis (RCBA) NPV, which takes into account rail operator 
costs and revenues, and changes in car user times and costs, including the external 
element of accident costs.  RCBA is required in a Section 56 appraisal.  The 
Department of Transport's 1989 circular on Section 56 Grant for Public Transport 
indicated that the financial losses of an investment project should be minimised (ie 
maximise financial NPV) and that these losses should be exceeded by non-user 
benefits.  In addition, additional grant, beyond the minimum required, may be 
provided if it can be shown that this is offset by an increase in non-user benefits (ie 
maximise RCBA NPV).  
 
5.MUPPIT contains a mode choice model which estimates the extent to which a new rail service 
attracts traffic from car and bus, and a numerical optimisation routine which adjusts rail 
service frequencies and fares so as to maximise any of the three evaluation measures.  An 
important feature of MUPPIT is that it incorporates the interaction between rail and the 
road-based modes by examining the second round effects of: 
 
 recongestion on the road network, and 
 bus operators reducing services or increasing fares in order to maintain profitability. 
 
6.We interpreted the second objective as follows. In a situation where the policy maker cannot 
control prices in either the car market (where, without intervention, price will be below 
marginal social cost) or the bus market (where, without intervention, price will be above 
marginal social cost), then there are no simple rules concerning the optimal rail price.  
Second-best theory tells us that in such situations the optimal rail price may be either above 
or below marginal social cost.  It is an empirical matter as to which should hold.  One 
argument for the current `Section 56' appraisal procedures for new rail schemes is that the 
restricted cost-benefit analysis acts as a proxy for the optimal second-best prices for rail 
because they take into account the cross-elasticity between car and rail, and the extent of the 
divergence between marginal social cost and average social cost on the congested road 
system.  It is this argument which we wished to test. 
 
7.This was done by a series of runs of the MUPPIT model. It was found that: 
 
 maximising Social NPV led to lower rail fares, higher rail frequencies and higher rail 
demand (typically 50% higher) than maximising RCBA NPV.  Gross costs were 
typically 15% higher, gross benefits were 20% higher and net social benefit was 
typically over 60% higher when maximising Social NPV than when maximising 
RCBA NPV. 
 
xrail user time and cost changes, which are included in a Social NPV measure but not in a RCBA or 
Financial NPV measure, typically account for 28-50% of gross scheme benefits. 
 
 maximising RCBA NPV typically led to lower rail fares, higher rail frequencies and higher 
rail demand than maximising Financial NPV, but the differences were not great. 
 
 for the theoretical scheme being considered, in all model runs tested the RCBA NPV was 
negative, while in 90% of the model runs undertaken the Social NPV was positive. 
 
8.These results were obtained consistently across a range of different scenarios, including:  
 
 allowing for the indivisibility of rail supply by restricting rail frequency to integer numbers 
of trains per hour; 
 taking into account lost tax revenue to Government; 
 changing the income elasticities, price elasticities and speed-flow relationships used in the 
model. 
 
9.We therefore conclude that the current procedures concerning the appraisal of new rail schemes 
can be distorting. In the theoretical case being examined, the current procedures would 
result in the scheme not being pursued, whereas the theoretically optimal form of 
intervention suggested by the Social NPV results would be to support the rail scheme 
through a capital grant.  More generally, the results suggest that current procedures do not 
lead to the maximisation of the social benefits of any particular scheme. 
 
10.We obtain these results for two reasons.  Firstly, the non-user benefits to car users are relatively 
modest when the re-congestion effects of travellers transferring to road because of improved 
road speeds are taken into account.  This result may be sensitive to the level of and variation 
in motorists' values of time (the values used in this study are lower than those used in some 
other Section 56 studies), the volume of road traffic abstracted by rail and the degree to 
which the road network and key junctions are congested in the base year.  Secondly, user 
benefits are substantial and cannot be captured through pricing-up (despite higher fares in 
the peak).  This result is dependent on our assumption that the rail operator can only price 
discriminate in terms of distance travelled and time of travel, although we believe these are 
the two dimensions of discrimination most commonly used in practice for urban rail 
services. 
 
11.Our third objective was achieved by analysing the model results.  We conclude that the proper 
application of current procedures needs to take into account the interaction between rail, car 
and bus. Many practical applications of current procedures have neglected these 
interactions, thus potentially overstating the benefits of congestion relief, and have ignored 
the disbenefits to bus users.  In other words, in practice the Financial, Social and RCBA 
NPVs may all be biased upwards thus strengthening the case for new rail schemes.  This 
means that the actual divergence between current practice and the theoretical optimum may 
be smaller than our work has suggested. Moreover, taking into account re-congestion effects 
when apprasing rail schemes but not taking into account re-congestion when appraising 
road schemes (which, by and large, is current practice) would distort comparisons by local 
authorities and central government of road and rail schemes. 
 
12.We have identified  a number of areas where additional data collection could improve current 
practice: 
 
 detailed data on base travel patterns; 
 data on cross-elasticities of demand between modes; 
 data on user and operator cost characteristics by mode; 
 data on the relationship between congestion, traffic patterns and new rail schemes; 
 data on actual responses by bus operators to new rail schemes. 
 
A number of areas for further research are also suggested. 
 
13.Overall, we conclude that the current procedures for determining intervention in the rail  market, 
given current policy constraints on intervention in the bus market, and the optimal form of 
intervention exhibit important differences. Hence, if Section 56 appraisals are undertaken, 
they should be accompanied by full social cost-benefit analysis so that any distortions which 
do arise are clear.  Our understanding is that this has recently become a Department of 
Transport requirement for Section 56 grant appraisal. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1This note constitutes the final report on the above study, undertaken by the Institute for Transport 
Studies (ITS) on behalf of the Department of Transport (DoT), the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) and the Passenger Transport Executive Group (PTEG). 
1.2The objectives of this study were as follows: 
 (a)to establish a simple economic model of urban transport operations, based on present 
policies, 
 (b)to estimate, using the model, the theoretically optimal form of intervention in urban rail 
under the present policy constraints and differences between this optimum and 
current procedures, 
 (c)to investigate how improved procedures might be implemented in practice in the light of 
the kind of data which are currently available or become available in the course of a 
Section 56 appraisal and to make suggestions for additional data collection. 
 
1.3The main analytical tool used to achieve these objectives was a micro economic partial 
equilibrium model of stylised urban transport operations within a given corridor.  This 
model has been based loosely on work we have done at ITS on the Nottingham-Mansfield 
corridor, is computer based and has been given the acronym MUPPIT (Model of Urban 
Pricing Policy in Transport).  The approach adopted has some similarities with work 
undertaken by others (Beesley, Gist and Glaister, 1983; Glaister, 1987). 
 
1.4Approaches based on adapting strategic integrated transport models such as START (MVA, 
1992) were rejected for the following reasons: 
 although these models are simplifications of the traditional land-use and transport study 
(LUTS) model the level of geographic detail is not appropriate for this study 
the feedback between demand and supply in these models is not usually explicit. 
The use of area-wide simulation models such as GUTS (Game of Urban Transport Simulation; 
Ortuzar and Willumsen, 1978) and its successor PLUTO (Planning Land-Use and Transport 
Options; Bonsall, 1992) were rejected for similar reasons. 
 
1.5The bulk of this report consists of the results of the base MUPPIT model runs (section 2), 
sensitivity analyses (section 3) and the conclusions (section 4). 
 
1.6Three technical notes have been produced: on the underlying theory of second best pricing 
(Preston and Nash, 1993), on empirical evidence of urban transport elasticities (Toner, 
1993) and on the details of the MUPPIT computer model of urban transport operations 
(Cooper and Preston, 1993). 
 
1.7MUPPIT is corridor based and consists of three generation zones and one attraction zone.  In the 
initial situation there are two modes (bus and car).  A new mode (rail) is then introduced and 
its market share estimated using binary logit models. 
 
1.8The binary logit models were not thought to be appropriate for sensitivity analysis.  Instead 
negative exponential demand models were developed based on empirical evidence on price 
elasticities, values of time and abstraction rates.  Linear additive public transport cost 
models have been developed, with car cost based on a parabolic speed-flow curve. 
 
1.9It is believed that MUPPIT is an advance on previous models for the following reasons: 
 it focuses on a single corridor rather than a whole conurbation 
 it can incorporate local fare and service level changes as well as global changes 
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 it can distinguish between peak and off-peak times of day 
 it incorporates up-to-date empirical evidence on service elasticities 
 all elasticities are transparent and capable of being changed by the model user 
 speed-flow relationships can be adjusted to represent a variety of congested and 
uncongested conditions 
 secondary effects of re-congestion on the road network are taken into account 
 bus operations are constrained to earn normal profits (defined as a 10% mark-up on costs) 
 the shadow price of public funds can be incorporated  
 accident costs have been included as per the DoT note on "The Treatment of Accidents in 
Section 56 Appraisals" (February 1992) 
 demand changes over time have been taken into account through the assumption of a 30 
year project life and real income growth of 2% per annum and the use of income 
elasticities. 
 
1.10MUPPIT produces three main evaluation measures 
 a Financial Net Present Value (NPV) that takes into account the changes in rail operator 
cost and revenue.   This is also referred to as financial appraisal. 
 a Social Net Present Value that takes into account changes in bus and rail operators' costs 
and revenues and changes in bus, rail and car user times and costs (including 
accidents and, if required, adjusted for taxation).  This is also referred to as social 
cost-benefit analysis.  Without adjusting for taxation, it is assumed that any loss of 
tax revenue to Government is compensated by equivalent savings in resource costs. 
 With the tax adjustment, it is assumed that the loss of tax revenue to Government is 
a disbenefit. This is equivalent to assuming that taxation is a non resource cost and 
is the procedure used in road scheme appraisal. 
 a Restricted Cost-Benefit Analysis (RCBA) Net Present Value that takes into account rail 
operator costs and revenue and changes in car user times and costs (including 
external elements of accident costs).  
 
1.11MUPPIT has a numerical optimisation routine that adjusts rail fares and frequencies so as to 
maximise any of the three evaluation measures for any individual year or for all 30 years. 
 
1.12MUPPIT has been written in FORTRAN, and can thus run on any hardware on which is 
mounted a suitable FORTRAN compiler.  PC-based and SUN-based versions are currently 
available.  For the PC-based version, 486 machines offer a considerably enhanced 
performance over 386 machines. 
 
1.13The demand elasticities used in the model are based on the best available evidence for typical 
own-price elasticities (Toner, 1993, HFA et al., 1993).  Evidence on cross-elasticities is less 
secure, and so these have been derived by recourse to theoretical reasoning.  A similar 
approach has been used to obtain the various time elasticities required.  It should though be 
noted that this approach, although internally consistent, led to to relatively low headway 
elasticities.  However, evidence from the town of Preston (Mackie and Preston, 1988) 
suggests that where there are high service levels the headway elasticity may be around -0.1, 
whilst evidence from Nottingham suggests that urban rail may have a headway elasticity of 
around -0.2.  All these values can be changed during a specific application to make use of 
the available location-specific evidence.  The base price elasticities, in-vehicle time 
elasticities, headway elasticities, peak/off-peak price elasticities and income elasticities used 
  
 
 4 
were as follows: 
 
Base demand elasticities 
Own elasticities Peak Off-peak 
 Bus Car Rail Bus Car Rail 
Price elasticity -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.9 
In-vehicle time elasticity -0.132 -0.070 -0.267 -0.171 -0.129 -0.326 
Headway elasticity -0.084 0 -0.195 -0.110 0 -0.220 
Peak/off-peak elasticity 0.150 0.050 0.350    
Income elasticity -0.3 1.2 0.6    
 
1.14The theory behind MUPPIT is that of second-best pricing (see Preston and Nash, 1993).  
Optimal second-best pricing, where the price of both bus and rail can be adjusted to offset 
distortions in the car market, requires that the price of rail be set below its marginal cost 
given that car is priced below marginal cost and that car and rail are substitutes.  Where the 
bus price cannot be controlled and is found to be above bus marginal cost, the restricted 
second-best price for rail can be either above or below marginal cost depending on the 
differences between price and marginal cost in the bus and car markets, the cross-elasticities 
between the modes and the extent of economies of scale in bus and rail operations. 
 
1.15The optimal restricted second-best price for rail is determined in MUPPIT by maximising the 
Social NPV.  The resultant prices and resource allocations can be compared with those 
obtained when maximising the Financial or RCBA NPVs.  This enables us to test the 
assertion that the RCBA measure required in a Section 56 appraisal represents a good proxy 
for optimal restricted second-best pricing.  It should be noted that the key criteria for the 
award of Section 56 grant set out in the Department of Transport's 1989 Grant Circular were 
that financial losses should be minimised (ie Financial NPV maximised) and that non-user 
benefits should exceed these losses.  Annexe A to the Grant Circular (Department of 
Transport, 1989) indicated that the DoT might be willing to provide additional grant, 
beyond the minimum required, if it could be shown that this grant is offset by non-user 
benefits (ie maximise RCBA NPV).  It is this latter criterion that forms the basis for the 
restricted social cost-benefit analysis undertaken in this report.    Maximising the Financial 
NPV may be expected to lead to rail price above marginal cost, and acts as a benchmark 
against which the other two policies of maximising Social NPV and maximising RCBA 
NPV may be assessed. 
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2. BASE MODEL RUNS 
 
2.1For the base demand and cost models, the following MUPPIT runs were undertaken: 
 maximise welfare 
 maximise producer surplus 
 maximise RCBA net benefits. 
In each case MUPPIT was run with a tax adjustment (assumes tax revenue lost by Government is a 
net disbenefit) and without a tax adjustment (ignores tax revenue lost by Government) and 
with and without integer service levels (to reflect indivisibility of supply).  This involved 12 
model runs in the base situation. 
 
2.2Key outputs include rail fare for the three zones (outer, middle, inner) and two time periods 
(peak and off-peak) and Net Present Values, based on an 8% discount rate and a 30 year 
project life, for each of the three evaluation scenarios.  The results are given by Tables One 
to Eight. 
 
2.3Tables One, Two and Three refer to the situation where non integer rail service is permitted and 
there are no tax adjustments. 
 
2.4Table One, part (a), shows that in all situations peak fares are substantially greater than off-peak 
fares and fares increase with distance from the central area.  Welfare maximisation involves 
substantially lower fares and higher service levels than either profit maximisation (loss 
minimisation) or RCBA NPV maximisation.  Rail fares tend to fall (with exceptions in the 
outer zones) and service levels increase between years one and thirty, reflecting the 
increased competitiveness of rail given road congestion.  Rail fares and service levels are 
broadly the same between the profit maximising and RCBA maximising scenarios in year 
one but in year 30 the RCBA maximising scenario gives lower fares particularly in the 
peak.  Again this is related to increased road congestion in year thirty.  MUPPIT, as it 
currently stands, does not produce marginal cost calculations as part of the model output.  
However, marginal costs can be estimated from the outputs that are produced.  For example, 
by comparing the producer surplus maximising and welfare maximising outputs in Table 
One, it was estimated that rail's marginal operating cost was £0.40 per passenger.  It can be 
seen that all rail fares in Table One, part (a) are substantially above this level.   
 
2.5Table One, part (b), illustrates the effect of the different policies on demand levels.  In year one, 
under welfare maximisation, rail has a 10% share of trips to the centre, compared with the 
bus share of 52% and the car share of 38%.  By year 30, rail's share has increased to 15%, 
car's share has increased to 47% and bus's share has decreased to 38%.  Similar trends are 
found under the other two policy options.  Rail demand in year one under welfare 
maximisation is 54% greater than rail demand in year one under producer surplus 
maximisation and 52% greater than under RCBA maximisation.  By year 30, the 
corresponding figures are 64% and 56%. 
 
2.6Table Two, part (a), shows that in the welfare maximising scenario, a Social NPV of £9.0 million 
is achieved compared to a Financial NPV of -£12.4 million and a RCBA NPV of -£8.4 
million for the same fare/service level combination.  Table Two, part (b), shows that the 
incorporation of a shadow price of public funds of 1.2 adjusts these results to become £6.5 
million, -£14.9 million and -£10.9 million respectively.  Table Two, part (c), shows that if 
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the shadow price of public funds is set at 2.0, these results become -£3.3 million, -£24.8 
million and -£20.8 million respectively.   The middle row of this table also shows that, with 
a  high shadow price of 2.0, there is little to choose between the various maximisation 
criteria in terms of the calculated social welfare effects, although the three NPV measures 
presented for each maximisation criteria remain strongly divergent.  The evaluation results 
are clearly sensitive to assumptions concerning the shadow price of public funds.  However, 
it should be noted that, unless stated otherwise, in what follows the results do not 
incorporate a shadow price of public funds.   
 
2.7By contrast, profit maximisation reduces the Social NPV to £5.0 million but increases the RCBA 
NPV to -£5.7 million and the Financial NPV to -£9.2 million (i.e. a saving of £3.2 million in 
public funds).  Similarly, RCBA maximisation reduces the Social NPV to £5.5 million and 
increases the RCBA NPV to (roundly) -£5.7 million and the Financial NPV (roundly) to -
£9.2 million.  In evaluation terms, maximising Financial NPV and RCBA NPV is broadly 
the same.  Compared with earlier results (Preston, 1992), we no longer are able to achieve a 
positive RCBA NPV as, due to re-congestion, non-user benefits are only valued at a 
maximum of £4 million over 30 years. 
 
2.8Table Three, part (a), gives a breakdown of daily gross costs and benefits for the welfare 
maximisation option in years one and thirty.  In  year one, rail capital costs (annualised 
assuming a 30 year project life and an 8% interest rate) make up 53% of gross costs, 
compared to the 35% contributed by rail operating costs, the 8% contributed by cost 
changes to bus operators (due to declining absolute profits) and bus users (due to increased 
journey times as a result of service withdrawals) and the 4% contributed by rail accidents 
costs.  In year thirty, rail capital costs, although constant in absolute terms, reduce in relative 
importance to 47% of gross costs, whilst rail operating costs increase to 37% and costs to 
the bus system increase to 10%.  In terms of gross benefits in year one 40% are attributed to 
rail revenue, 50% to rail user benefits and only 10% to road user benefits.  Only around 
44% of rail users' willingness to pay is captured through the fare box and user benefits are 
five times larger than non-user benefits.  However, by year thirty, non-user benefits increase 
to form 18% of gross benefits and user benefits are less than three times larger than non-
user benefits. 
 
2.9Table Three, part (b), breaks down daily costs and benefits for the objective of maximising rail 
producer surplus.  The main features are that capital costs become relatively more important 
(contributing to 60% of gross costs in year one), the amount of rail users' willingness to pay 
captured by the fare-box has increased (to 56% in year one and to 65% in year thirty) and 
the ratio of user to non-user benefits has decreased (to 4:1 in year one and 1.3:1 in year 
thirty). 
 
 
2.10Table Three, part (c), breaks down daily costs and benefits for the objective of maximising 
RCBA NPV.  The results are broadly similar to those of maximising rail producer surplus, 
except that rail revenue is less important as a source of gross benefits and rail user benefit is 
more important, especially in year thirty. 
 
2.11To be consistent with the emerging Common Investment Appraisal Framework (MVA et al., 
1993) it would be desirable for the results in Table Three to be re-expressed as thirty year 
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present values.  MUPPIT is not currently set up to provide such output but it is hoped that 
the program can be modified to do so in the future.  
 
2.12Nevertheless, comparisons between Tables Three (a) and (c) give some indication of the causes 
of the differences in Social NPV under the various maximisation criteria noted in 
paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 above.  It can be seen that total benefits are some 22% higher in year 
one (20% in year thirty) under Social Welfare maximisation than under RCBA NPV  
maximisation and that the main difference is in rail user benefits (50% higher).  Total costs, 
on the other hand, are only 18% higher in year one (16% in year thirty), with the main 
change being in rail operating costs (up 30%).  Given that gross benefits and costs are quite 
similar in magnitude, these relatively slight differences in the percentage variations in gross 
costs and benefits translate into large differences in net benefits.  Net benefits are 78% 
higher in year one (28% higher in year thirty) under Social Welfare maximisation than 
under RCBA NPV maximisation.     
         
2.13Tables Four and Five refer to the situation where only an integer level of rail service is 
permitted and there is no tax adjustment.  The main effect is that Financial NPV reduces 
with a corresponding effect on Social NPV and RCBA NPV.  In some instances in Table 
Four (for example Outer, Peak - Year One), the fare when maximising RCBA NPV is 
higher than the fare which maximises rail producer surplus, despite the same frequencies.  
This result may be attributed to imprecision in the iteration process, and may be thought of 
as a form of rounding error (see also paragraph 3.2). 
 
2.14Tables Six and Seven refer to the situation where non integer rail service is permitted and an 
adjustment is made to take into account transfers from highly taxed car to zero taxed rail.  In 
Table Six fares tend to increase and service levels tend to decrease compared to Table One 
for the welfare maximisation and RCBA NPV maximisation scenarios (the producer surplus 
maximisation scenario is unaffected).  As expected the social benefits of rail are reduced, 
with the maximum Social NPV being £5.5 million, the Financial NPV being -£11.7 million 
and the RCBA NPV being -£11.2 million.  Assuming that the shadow price of public funds 
is 1.2, these figures become £2.2 million, -£14.0 million and - £13.5 million respectively.  
The reduction in the social benefits of rail means that the patronage under welfare 
maximisation and RCBA NPV maximisation is less than in the case where no tax 
adjustments are made. 
 
2.15Tables Eight and Nine refer to the situation where only an integer level of rail service is 
permitted and tax adjustments have been made.  Compared to Table Two, rail services are 
the same but rail fares tend to be higher for the maximise Social NPV and maximise RCBA 
NPV scenarios.  The social benefits of rail are again reduced compared with the appropriate 
Table (Table Five), with the Social NPV reducing to £4.5m, the Financial NPV to -£12.8 
million and the RCBA NPV reducing to -£12.0 million.  Assuming that the shadow price of 
public funds is 1.2, these results become £1.9 million, -£15.4 million and -£14.6 million. 
 
 
3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
3.1Sensitivity analysis was undertaken with respect to assumptions concerning income elasticities, 
fares elasticities and speed-flow relationships.  The results are given by Tables Ten to 
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Nineteen. 
 
3.2Tables Ten and Eleven, which depict the case where income elasticities for all modes are set to 
zero, show that the assumption of traffic growth over time contributes substantially to the 
various NPV measures.  Under no growth, the optimal fares and frequencies remain 
unchanged over time (subject to rounding errors).  The result is that Producer Surplus 
maximisation and RCBA maximisation cannot show positive Social NPVs, given the 
particular values input into the model in this case study.  This is because the lack of road 
traffic growth means there is no increase in congestion.  It is also worth noting that the loss 
in social welfare from following Producer Surplus maximisation is reduced from £4.0 
million (Table Two) to £2.9 million (Table Eleven) if there is zero traffic growth.  
 
3.3Tables Twelve and Thirteen present the results under a conservative assumption of low road 
traffic growth, achieved by setting the road traffic income elasticity equal to 0.2 .  The 
welfare maximisation and RCBA NPV maximisation results for year 30 have slightly higher 
fares and lower service levels than the base (Tables One and Two) and the NPVs are lower, 
with a Social NPV of £5.8 million under welfare maximisation (£9.0 million with higher 
growth), and a RCBA NPV of -£7.9 million (low growth) compared with -£5.7 million. 
Lower road traffic growth reduces the size of the decline in the bus market, due to slower 
growth in congestion making bus services more attractive. The increase in rail traffic over 
the life of the project is smaller, the smaller increase in road congestion meaning that fewer 
drivers switch to rail. 
 
3.4Tables Fourteen and Fifteen show the effects of increasing the assumed own-price elasticities for 
public transport.  The values tested were -0.8 for rail in the peak and -1.1 in the off-peak and 
-0.4 for bus in the peak and -0.7 in the off-peak.  The most significant differences are the 
reduced fares under Producer Surplus maximisation, the increased off-peak service 
frequencies, and the reduced off-peak fares under welfare maximisation and RCBA NPV 
maximisation.  This may lead to important changes in differentials.  For example, in Table 
One the outer zone peak fare is 30% lower under welfare maximisation than under producer 
surplus maximisation.  In Table Fourteen the difference is reduced to 26%.  Whatever the 
optimand, each NPV measure (financial, social and RCBA) is reduced.  For example, the 
Social NPV under welfare maximisation is £7.7 million compared with £9.0 million, and 
the Financial NPV under RCBA NPV maximisation is -£9.7 million compared with -£9.2 
million. 
 
3.5Tables Sixteen to Nineteen show the effects of an exogenous shift in the speed-flow curves and 
has been incorporated as a proportionate reduction in speed at a given capacity.  Reductions 
of 10 per cent (Tables Sixteen and Seventeen) and 20 per cent (Tables Eighteen and 
Nineteen) were used.  By and large these changes cause off-peak fares to fall and peak fares 
to rise compared with the base.  This result occurs because of the cross effects between peak 
and off-peak rail and car travel and the differences in rail and car peak and off-peak 
marginal costs.  As the absolute difference between peak and off-peak road journey times 
increases, so does the attractiveness in both financial and social terms of carrying rail 
passengers in the off-peak rather than the peak.  Peak service levels are broadly unchanged, 
but off-peak train service frequency increases.  The result of this is to hasten the decline in 
patronage of the bus industry (due to the slower speeds, bus is less attractive), lessen the 
increase in car traffic and increase the use of rail.  All this combines to give higher NPVs 
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whichever measure is used.  A 20% reduction in speeds causes the best RCBA NPV figure 
to increase from -£5.7 million to -£2.8 million, of which £2.1 million is due to the improved 
financial performance.  So in more congested conditions, a scheme is more justifiable 
whatever the assessment criterion used. 
 
4.CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1Results for all evaluation measures suggest in most cases that rail fares and frequency should be 
higher in the peak than the off-peak.  Zonal fares should increase with distance but not in a 
strict proportional manner. 
 
4.2Three different objectives have been assessed: 
 minimise losses (i.e. maximise Financial NPV) 
 maximise net external benefits, defined in our model as benefits to road users (i.e. 
maximise RCBA NPV) 
 maximise net social benefits (i.e. maximise Social NPV), either unconstrained or 
constrained so that rail revenue covers operating costs. (In this example, it turned 
out that maximising Net Social Benefits always resulted in rail revenue covering 
operating costs.) 
 
4.3The model results show that the main trade-off is between subsidy and unpriced user benefits.  
For example, taking Table Two, part (a), and comparing the results of welfare maximisation 
with those of producer surplus maximisation, our work suggests that spending an additional 
£3.22 million on subsidy yields an additional £0.50 million in non-user benefits and £6.74 
million in user benefits.  User benefits are substantial and can not be fully captured through 
pricing-up.  This result is dependent on our assumption that the rail operator can only price 
discriminate in terms of distance travelled and time of travel.  However, we believe this 
assumption is realistic for urban transport but may be less so for inter-urban transport where 
more sophisticated price discrimination may be practised. 
   
4.4Throughout the model runs, it was not possible to obtain a positive RCBA NPV measure, 
notwithstanding that a number of actual studies of new rail schemes have done so (Preston, 
1992; Tyson, unpublished).  A possible reason for this is that, while conventional studies 
have calculated only the first round decongestion benefits to remaining road traffic on the 
introduction of rail, MUPPIT then allows a transfer back from rail to road as a result of 
increased traffic speeds, and keeps on iterating until the road system has reached a stable 
equilibrium position.  The true benefits of RCBA maximisation, given by the Social NPV, 
are always considerably less than the optimal form of intervention as given by the Social 
NPV under welfare maximisation.  Indeed, because RCBA maximisation does not coincide 
with welfare maximisation, a choice of projects based on the RCBA criterion may lead to 
the wrong decision being made, since the RCBA NPV result under welfare maximisation is 
necessarily inferior to the best RCBA NPV.  While the precise results obtained depend on 
the input parameters, the pattern is clear.  The base case obtains net social benefits of £5.468 
million if RCBA benefits are maximised compared with a theoretical maximum of £9.040 
million.  This sort of difference of £3 million or so (or one third of the net benefits) occurs 
across all the scenarios evaluated.   
 
4.5These findings support the views of Bates and Lowe (1989) that the Section 56 rules (as defined 
in the 1989 Grant Circular) are unlikely to be met except in the case where revenue exceeds 
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costs, so obviating the need for grant, unless above average values of time for some or all 
transferring car users allow higher public transport revenue while maintaining non-user 
benefits.  It should be noted that the model used assumes relatively low values of time 
(around one to two pence per minute at 1988 prices) and hence low in-vehicle time 
elasticities.  In addition, it should be noted that in the case study modelled only a modest 
volume of traffic is abstracted from road (around 2,800 person trips per day or 2,300 vehicle 
trips per day in year one of the base run) and that the road system is relatively uncongested. 
 
4.6We are aware that recent studies in South Hampshire and Leeds have resulted in evaluations in 
which the RCBA NPV has been positive but the Financial NPV has been negative, 
eventhough use was made of a modelling technique (SATCHMO) that allows for the 
second round effects of re-congestion (Willumsen et al., 1993).  The South Hampshire and 
Leeds studies assume higher values of motorists' time (6.8 pence per minute and 5.4 pence 
per minute respectively) and may have forecast higher volumes of traffic abstracted from 
road or assumed higher base levels of congestion (or both)  than in our study.     
 
4.7It is also clear that it is necessary for the input parameters, that is the elasticities, the valuations of 
time and the speed-flow relationships, to be determined accurately in each application of the 
model.  Importing incorrect parameters from elsewhere may cause unacceptably large 
divergences between forecast and actual financial and social performances of schemes.  
However, in the case studied the sensitivity tests showed that, over plausible ranges, the 
same result occurred, namely that the new rail scheme could be justified on the basis of a 
full social cost-benefit appraisal but could not be justified on the basis of a restricted cost-
benefit (Section 56) appraisal. 
 
4.8Results suggest that the rail fares and frequencies resulting from the objective of maximising net 
social benefits are different from the other objectives.  The results from financial appraisal 
and restricted social cost-benefit analysis appear broadly similar.  The results of the model 
runs largely conform to a priori expectations.  Welfare maximisation generally leads to 
noticeably higher frequencies and lower fares than producer surplus maximisation or RCBA 
NPV maximisation.  RCBA NPV maximisation more often than not produces higher 
frequencies and lower fares than producer surplus maximisation, but the difference is often 
not pronounced.   
 
4.9Sensitivity analysis has been undertaken with respect to income, price and service elasticities, 
and with respect to speed-flow conditions.  This has shown that the benefits of potential 
schemes depend crucially on forecasts of overall traffic growth, in particular on increasing 
traffic creating congestion which a scheme can then alleviate.   
 
4.10When considering the model results with respect to the theoretical optimum form of 
intervention in urban rail, under the present policy constraints, and differences between this 
optimum and current procedures, we conclude that the current procedures can lead to 
distortions.  In our base case (Table Two, part (a)), RCBA NPV maximisation leads to a 
40% reduction in net social benefit compared with welfare maximisation.  Moreover, in 
none of our twenty seven model runs are we able to produce a positive RCBA NPV, while a 
positive Social NPV is obtained in all but two of our model runs.  Thus in the vast majority 
of cases studied, full social cost-benefit analysis and restricted cost benefit analysis are 
giving different policy signals. 
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4.11Detailed recommendations on the way that Section 56 appraisal may be implemented in the 
light of the way data are currently available or become available in the course  of an 
appraisal have been made by HFA (1991).  Our work has highlighted the following  areas 
where existing practice requires particular improvement: 
 the determination of base year matrices, times and costs for bus and car; 
 the need for a modelling process which deals explicitly with suppressed and generated 
trips. Our approach was based on negative exponential functions, although other 
functional forms could be used; 
 demand and cost models are required to determine the appropriate fares for rail under a 
given set of objectives.  These fares should vary by time of day and distance; 
 the need to take into account the effect of recongestion of the road network.  Our work was 
based on truncated parabolic area speed-flow curves. A particular problem emerged 
in conditions of saturation, where it was necessary to cap demand on the road 
network.  Nevertheless, at the new equilibrium, typically only two-thirds of the 
traffic initially abstracted from road remains with rail, a figure consistent with the 
50-75% range suggested by HFA.  It should, though, be noted that taking into 
account re-congestion when appraising rail schemes but not taking re-congestion 
into account when appraising road schemes (by and large the current practice) 
would distort comparisons by local authorities and central government of road and 
rail scheme returns; 
 the need to take into account the effects on the bus network. In order to maintain normal 
profits, bus operators are assumed to reduce service frequencies.  This leads to 
losses in consumer surplus for existing bus users. This effect has been neglected by 
many studies; 
 the effects on accidents are non-trivial and should be included as a separate item rather than 
lumped together with time savings and operating cost reductions; 
 important changes in demand and supply will occur over the life of a project, and these 
should be explicitly considered. 
 
4.12The main points to emerge from our study are, firstly, that it is not sensible to examine a rail 
scheme in isolation, since there are important interactions between modes. In particular, the 
interaction with the bus market has been neglected in past studies.  Secondly, we have 
highlighted that one of the main areas for improvement is the use of demand and cost 
models to determine the optimal level and structure of fares for any given objective and the 
use of these models to assess how these fares and service levels might change over the 
appraisal period.   
 
4.13In terms of additional data collection, we suggest the following: 
 Our theoretical work has shown that the key determinants of optimal rail price in the 
restricted second-best case considered are: 
  -the cross-elasticities of rail, bus and car demand. Additional empirical evidence is 
required, possibly based on diversion factors (that is, the proportion of new 
demand on mode A abstracted from mode B); 
  -the social cost characteristics (ie operator costs, user costs and non-user costs) of 
car, rail and bus travel.  Work in this area initiated by Meyer, Kain and 
Wohl (1965) might be updated and extended to include new modes such as 
light rapid transit; 
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 work should be undertaken on assessing the impact of new urban rail services on area 
speed-flow relationships for the competing road system; 
 work should be undertaken on assessing the response of competing bus operators to new 
urban rail services. 
 
We understand that monitoring work has been commissioned by the DoT and others on the 
Manchester Metrolink and Sheffield Supertram schemes, and we recommend that the issues 
mentioned here be addressed in these studies. 
 
4.14In terms of further work, we suggest the following: 
 continued development and testing of MUPPIT. For example, as part of his dissertation, an 
MA student is using the program to assess the effect which road pricing might have 
on new rail schemes; 
 the development of network based approaches. We have assumed a single link between 
each origin and destination pair and have therefore avoided the problems of 
definition of base year and future networks and assignments.  However, this has 
also meant that we have only been able to measure congestion on the basis of area 
speed-flow relationships. A network-based approach would allow more detailed 
congestion monitoring based on junction delay.  Use of the nascent elastic 
assignment and multi-modal assignment packages (such as SATCHMO) might be 
considered; 
 an extension to include the effects of environmental and developmental benefits; 
 comparison of the results from this study with the results of similar studies based on 
strategic integrated transport models and area-wide simulation models; 
 the implications of our work with respect to the common investment appraisal framework 
project is that the framework should be capable of comparing the performance of 
different price/service level options for any given rail scheme.  Further, such 
comparisions should be able to bring out the probable trade-off between user 
benefits and financial appraisal and the impacts on bus service levels and patronage 
of the introduction of competing rail-based transport.  We understand that the 
proposed framework put forward by MVA (1993) seems to meet these 
requirements. 
   
4.15Overall, we conclude that current procedures for determining intervention in the urban rail 
market and the optimal form of intervention exhibit important differences.  Hence, if 
Section 56 appraisals are undertaken, the restricted cost-benefit analysis should be 
accompanied by full social cost-benefit analysis so that any distortions which do arise are 
clear.  The Department of Transport has acknowledged, in a House of Commons Written 
Answer in July 1992 that full cost-benefit analysis may have a wider role to play in urban 
transport schemes.  The recent Transport Policies and Programme Circular (2/93) 
specifically asked local authorities to supplement Section 56 grant appraisal with the results 
of a full social cost-benefit analysis. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The following Institute for Transport Studies staff worked on this project: John Preston, Jeremy 
Toner, Chris Nash and Adam Cooper.  This report was written by John Preston and Jeremy Toner.  
  
 
 13 
The authors are grateful for the comments received from Colin Poole (DoT) and Julian Laidler 
(AMA).  The usual caveat applies.  
  
 
 14 
Table One (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.40  
 £0.85  
 £0.96  
 £0.72  
 £0.51  
 £0.39  
 2.35  
 1.63  
 £1.43  
 £0.71  
 £0.88  
 £0.63  
 £0.49  
 £0.32  
 2.81  
 2.04  
 £1.99  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.71  
 1.10  
 £2.01  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.87  
 1.35  
 £1.99  
 £1.39  
 £1.47  
 £1.09  
 £0.76  
 £0.56  
 1.82  
 1.11  
 £1.85  
 £1.39  
 £1.29  
 £1.01  
 £0.73  
 £0.54  
 1.87  
 1.36  
 
Table One (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
23978 
17551 
4952 
19453 
24615 
8033 
24642 
18245 
3218 
20475 
25960 
4885 
24620 
18220 
3275 
20401 
25887 
5156 
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Table Two (a) 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -12.383  
 9.040  
 -8.400  
 -9.163  
 5.017  
 -5.686  
 -9.181  
 5.468  
 -5.657  
 
Table Two (b) 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment. Shadow Pice of Public 
Funds 1.2) (£m) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -14.860  
 6.563  
 -10.877  
 -10.997  
 3.184  
 -7.519  
 -11.017  
 3.631  
 -7.493  
 
Table Two (c) 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment. Shadow Price of Public 
Funds 2.0) (£m) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -24.766  
 -3.343  
 -20.783  
 -18.326  
 -4.146  
 -14.849  
 -18.362  
-3.713  
 -14.838  
  
 
 16 
Table Three (a) Breakdown of Daily Costs and Benefits. Welfare Maximisation. (Non Integer 
Service Levels and No Tax Adjustments) (£) 
 
Year One 
Costs   % Benefits   % 
Rail Capital  4427.1  53 Rail Revenue  3712.7  40 
Rail Operating  2962.0  35 Rail User  4649.3  50 
Bus Operator  449.4  5 Car Users  344.0  4 
Bus User   277.5  3 Car Accidents  559.5  6 
Rail Accidents  301.9  4 Bus Accidents  42.3  - 
TOTAL  8417.9  100   9307.8  100 
 
Year Thirty  
Costs   % Benefits   % 
Rail Capital  4427.1  47 Rail Revenue  5091.8  33 
Rail Operating  3443.8  37 Rail User  7430.6  49 
Bus Operator  670.4  7 Car Users  1925.2  13 
Bus User   299.5  3 Car Accidents  733.8  5 
Rail Accidents  489.7  5 Bus Accidents  26.8  - 
TOTAL  9330.5  100   15208.2  100 
 
Table Three (b) Breakdown of Daily Costs and Benefits. Producer Surplus Maximisation. (Non 
Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustments) (£) 
 
Year One 
Costs   % Benefits   % 
Rail Capital  4213.6  60 Rail Revenue  3730.5  50 
Rail Operating  2267.9  32 Rail User  3007.8  40 
Bus Operator  57.9  - Car Users  315.6  4 
Bus User   331.7  5 Car Accidents  413.1  6 
Rail Accidents  196.1  3 Bus Accidents  42.3  - 
TOTAL  7067.2  100   7509.3  100 
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Table Three (b) Continued 
 
Year Thirty 
Costs   % Benefits   % 
Rail Capital  4427.1  56 Rail Revenue  5506.3  52 
Rail Operating  2542.8  32 Rail User  2963.6  28 
Bus Operator  587.5  7 Car Users  1695.4  16 
Bus User   107.5  1 Car Accidents  491.6  5 
Rail Accidents  297.8  4 Bus Accidents  16.6  - 
TOTAL  7962.7  100   10673.5  100 
 
Table Three (c) Breakdown of Daily Costs and Benefits. RCBA NPV Maximisation. (Non Integer 
Service Levels and No Tax Adjustments) (£) 
 
Year One 
Costs   % Benefits   % 
Rail Capital  4213.6  59 Rail Revenue  3751.2  49 
Rail Operating  2291.7  32 Rail User  3078.6  41 
Bus Operator  73.5  1 Car Users  317.3  4 
Bus User   329.3  5 Car Accidents  419.4  6 
Rail Accidents  199.6  3 Bus Accidents  42.3  - 
TOTAL  7107.7  100   7608.8  100 
 
Year Thirty 
Costs   % Benefits   % 
Rail Capital  4427.1  55 Rail Revenue  5524.3  44 
Rail Operating  2568.5  32 Rail User  4858.2  38 
Bus Operator  593.9  7 Car Users  1731.3  14 
Bus User   125.9  2 Car Accidents  506.2  4 
Rail Accidents  314.4  4 Bus Accidents  17.4  - 
TOTAL  8029.8  100   12637.4  100 
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Table Four (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.48  
 £0.81  
 £1.03  
 £0.65  
 £0.53  
 £0.34  
 2.00  
 2.00  
 £1.38  
 £0.72  
 £0.86  
 £0.65  
 £0.61  
 £0.25  
 3.00  
 2.00  
 £1.98  
 £1.46  
 £1.46  
 £1.09  
 £0.78  
 £0.56  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 £1.98  
 £1.46  
 £1.46  
 £1.09  
 £0.80  
 £0.54  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 £2.00  
 £1.40  
 £1.40  
 £1.08  
 £0.75  
 £0.57  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 £1.82  
 £1.40  
 £1.28  
 £1.06  
 £0.74  
 £0.55  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 
Table Four (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
23894 
17485 
5179 
17380 
24548 
8640 
24626 
18249 
3136 
18287 
26083 
4746 
24610 
18232 
3189 
18138 
25967 
4978 
 
Table Five 
Net Present Values (Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -13.289  
 8.254  
 -8.836  
 -9.541  
 4.262  
 -5.973  
 -9.560  
 4.669  
 -5.964  
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Table Six (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and Tax Adjustments) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.42  
 £0.95  
 £1.03  
 £0.74  
 £0.51  
 £0.41  
 2.29  
 1.60  
 £1.44  
 £0.81  
 £0.93  
 £0.69  
 £0.50  
 £0.34  
 2.81  
 2.05  
 £1.99  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.71  
 1.11  
 £2.01  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.87  
 1.35  
 £2.05  
 £1.54  
 £1.50  
 £1.12  
 £0.79  
 £0.56  
 1.69  
 1.07  
 £1.95  
 £1.48  
 £1.43  
 £1.12  
 £0.77  
 £0.57  
 1.88  
 1.31  
 
Table Six (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and Tax Adjustments) 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
24070 
17649 
4786 
19611 
24789 
7751 
24642 
18245 
3218 
20475 
25960 
4885 
24699 
18301 
3041 
20502 
25998 
4760 
 
Table Seven 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and Tax Adjustments) (£m) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -11.693  
 5.477  
 -11.159  
 -9.163  
 2.399  
 -8.306  
 -9.188  
 2.006  
 -8.297  
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Table Eight (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Integer Service Levels and Tax Adjustments) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.52  
 £0.92  
 £1.07  
 £0.73  
 £0.54  
 £0.37  
 2.00  
 2.00  
 £1.41  
 £0.81  
 £0.92  
 £0.71  
 £0.59  
 £0.28  
 3.00  
 2.00  
 £1.98  
 £1.46  
 £1.46  
 £1.09  
 £0.78  
 £0.56  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 £1.98  
 £1.46  
 £1.46  
 £1.09  
 £0.78  
 £0.54  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 £2.08  
 £1.49  
 £1.44  
 £1.15  
 £0.77  
 £0.58  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 £1.91  
 £1.51  
 £1.39  
 £1.14  
 £0.77  
 £0.57  
 2.00  
 1.00  
 
Table Eight (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Integer Service Levels and Tax Adjustments) 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
24001 
17600 
4991 
17491 
24645 
8323 
24626 
18249 
3136 
18287 
26083 
4746 
24655 
18279 
3054 
18254 
26047 
4685 
 
Table Nine 
Net Present Values (Integer Service Levels and Tax Adjustments) 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -12.830  
 4.473  
 -12.035  
 -9.541  
 1.631  
 -8.604  
 -9.563  
 1.394  
 -8.616  
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Table Ten (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with no traffic growth 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.40  
 £0.85  
 £0.96  
 £0.72  
 £0.51  
 £0.39  
 2.35  
 1.63  
 £1.41  
 £0.85  
 £0.96  
 £0.72  
 £0.51  
 £0.39  
 2.35  
 1.63  
 £1.99  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.71  
 1.11  
 £1.99  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.77  
 £0.56  
 1.74  
 1.10  
 £1.99  
 £1.39  
 £1.47  
 £1.04  
 £0.76  
 £0.56  
 1.82  
 1.11  
 £1.93  
 £1.43  
 £1.39  
 £1.04  
 £0.76  
 £0.56  
 1.84  
 1.09  
 
Table  Ten (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with no traffic growth 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
23978 
17551 
4952 
23961 
17556 
4955 
24642 
18245 
3218 
24789 
18235 
3184 
24620 
18220 
3275 
24763 
18214 
3238 
 
Table Eleven 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
with no traffic growth 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -13.272  
 2.348  
 -11.736  
 -10.948  
 -0.530  
 -9.719  
 -10.953  
 -0.324  
 -9.560  
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Table Twelve (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with low car traffic growth 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.40  
 £0.85  
 £0.96  
 £0.72  
 £0.51  
 £0.39  
 2.35  
 1.63  
 £1.46  
 £0.75  
 £1.00  
 £0.64  
 £0.53  
 £0.34  
 2.70  
 2.00  
 £1.99  
 £1.44  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.71  
 1.11  
 £2.00  
 £1.43  
 £1.48  
 £1.06  
 £0.79  
 £0.54  
 1.88  
 1.32  
 £1.99  
 £1.39  
 £1.47  
 £1.04  
 £0.76  
 £0.56  
 1.82  
 1.11  
 £1.93  
 £1.42  
 £1.41  
 £1.07  
 £0.78  
 £0.55  
 1.87  
 1.31  
 
Table Twelve (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with low car traffic growth 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
23978 
17551 
4952 
20056 
18973 
7367 
24642 
18245 
3218 
20959 
19889 
4591 
24620 
18220 
3275 
20997 
19880 
4608 
 
Table Thirteen 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
with low car traffic growth 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -12.281  
 5.769  
 -10.438  
 -9.501  
 2.251  
 -7.849  
 -9.523  
 2.520  
 -7.859  
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Table Fourteen (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with higher price elasticities 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.37  
 £0.73  
 £0.81  
 £0.64  
 £0.40  
 £0.35  
 2.36  
 1.82  
 £1.49  
 £0.58  
 £0.92  
 £0.51  
 £0.58  
 £0.23  
 2.81  
 2.49  
 £1.84  
 £1.19  
 £1.35  
 £0.88  
 £0.71  
 £0.45  
 1.72  
 1.24  
 £1.85  
 £1.18  
 £1.35  
 £0.90  
 £0.75  
 £0.44  
 1.87  
 1.57  
 £1.78  
 £1.19  
 £1.33  
 £0.86  
 £0.69  
 £0.46  
 1.81  
 1.23  
 £1.72  
 £1.15  
 £1.17  
 £0.85  
 £0.70  
 £0.45  
 1.87  
 1.55  
 
Table Fourteen (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with higher price elasticities 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
23187 
17260 
5699 
17844 
23509 
10258 
24004 
18152 
3755 
19124 
25395 
5993 
23982 
18131 
3785 
19038 
25327 
6190 
 
Table Fifteen 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
with higher price elasticities 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -12.829  
 7.650  
 -8.257  
 -9.687  
 4.164  
 -5.497  
 -9.723  
 4.688  
 -5.477  
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Table Sixteen (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with speeds reduced by 10% 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.29  
 £0.78  
 £0.80  
 £0.69  
 £0.48  
 £0.35  
 2.46  
 1.76  
 £1.52  
 £0.64  
 £0.94  
 £0.58  
 £0.60  
 £0.26  
 2.81  
 2.24  
 £2.03  
 £1.41  
 £1.49  
 £1.07  
 £0.82  
 £0.52  
 1.72  
 1.18  
 £2.03  
 £1.41  
 £1.49  
 £1.07  
 £0.82  
 £0.52  
 1.87  
 1.45  
 £1.91  
 £1.41  
 £1.41  
 £1.05  
 £0.81  
 £0.52  
 1.86  
 1.17  
 £1.84  
 £1.36  
 £1.30  
 £1.03  
 £0.75  
 £0.53  
 1.87  
 1.45  
 
Table Sixteen (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with speeds reduced by 10% 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
22897 
17271 
5798 
18208 
24211 
9325 
23677 
18097 
3638 
19284 
25689 
5507 
23645 
18065 
3727 
19225 
25624 
5750 
 
Table Seventeen 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
with speeds reduced by 10% 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -12.139  
 10.334  
 -7.650  
 -8.061  
 5.704  
 -4.251  
 -8.093  
 6.248  
 -4.213  
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Table Eighteen (a) 
Rail Fares and Service Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with speeds reduced by 20% 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30  Year 1  Year 30 
Outer   - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Middle - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Inner  - Peak Fare 
  - Off-Peak Fare 
Service - Peak 
  - Off-Peak 
 £1.56  
 £0.72  
 £0.94  
 £0.65  
 £0.40  
 £0.34  
 2.43  
 1.85  
 £1.56  
 £0.59  
 £0.94  
 £0.56  
 £0.65  
 £0.24  
 2.81  
 2.35  
 £2.05  
 £1.40  
 £1.51  
 £1.05  
 £0.82  
 £0.53  
 1.77  
 1.26  
 £2.05  
 £1.40  
 £1.51  
 £1.05  
 £0.84  
 £0.52  
 1.87  
 1.53  
 £1.98  
 £1.35  
 £1.44  
 £1.05  
 £0.82  
 £0.53  
 1.86  
 1.24  
 £1.84  
 £1.34  
 £1.31  
 £1.03  
 £0.79  
 £0.53  
 1.87  
 1.55  
 
Table Eighteen (b) 
Daily Demand Levels (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) 
with speeds reduced by 20% 
 
 Welfare 
 Maximisation 
Producer Surplus 
Maximisation 
RCBA Maximisation 
 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 Year 1 Year 30 
Bus 
Car 
Rail 
22177 
16984 
6463 
17214 
23783 
10577 
22979 
17840 
4030 
18313 
25424 
6115 
22954 
17817 
4088 
18248 
25368 
6347 
 
Table Nineteen 
Net Present Values (Non Integer Service Levels and No Tax Adjustment) (£m) 
with speeds reduced by 20% 
 
  Welfare 
 Maximisation 
 Producer Surplus 
 Maximisation 
 RCBA 
 Maximisation 
Financial 
Social 
RCBA 
 -11.692  
 11.492  
 -6.880  
 -7.001  
 6.960  
 -2.806  
 -7.039  
 7.569  
 -2.755  
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